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Abstract: Prompted by rising concern about weak consumer switching and the practice of price
discrimination, over the period of 2016–2019, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)
undertook a series of trials on communication-based interventions to encourage consumer switching
in the United Kingdom. The main purpose of this paper is to assess the experience of these Ofgem
trials with a view to draw some lessons for policy makers. The analytical framework adopted for
this purpose is informed by existing literature on the barriers for consumer switching. The results of
the analysis suggest that while the Ofgem trials have made positive impacts on consumer switching,
these impacts varied significantly across the trials, suggesting that some interventions were more
effective than others. Further, the overall impacts of the Ofgem trials were moderate, as around 70%
of participants did not switch suppliers even in the most impactful trial. This reflects a general lack
of understanding in the literature about the behaviour-influencing factors, their impacts, and their
context-connects. By implication, the difficulty in stimulating consumer switching, as demonstrated
by the Ofgem trials, suggests that weak consumer switching and the practice of price discrimination
may simply reflect significant competition, rather than a lack of it, especially if retail margins are
not greater than the competitive level. In this case, the communication-based intervention aimed at
encouraging consumer switching may lead to further price discrimination, especially for the most
vulnerable consumers, who are more likely to stay with their incumbent suppliers.
Keywords: weak consumer switching; price discrimination; behavioural economics; communication-
based interventions; fairness
1. Introduction
Electricity market reforms have been underway worldwide for nearly three decades now.
The majority of developed countries and more than 70 countries have undertaken steps to reform
their electricity industries [1]. These reforms were expected to introduce market competition in the
electricity industry through restructuring, privatisation, and re-regulation [2]. This, it was argued,
would result in efficient allocation of resources, drive down electricity prices, and provide appropriate
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signals for system expansion [3–6]. As part of the industry-wide reform programs, several countries
(including, Australia, most European countries, New Zealand, and some states of the United States)
also introduced competition in the retail segment of their electricity industries, where consumers were
given the choice of selecting their own energy suppliers, despite considerable debate on the worthiness
of retail competition for household consumers in the literature [7–10].
However, the outcomes of retail competition—expressed in terms of, for example, consumer
switching—look considerably different than what was expected in many cases [9,11,12]. Even in the
United Kingdom (UK), where the retail market is widely considered as competitive as compared
with most other countries, there seems to be a growing concern in recent years about weak consumer
switching and the practice of price discrimination (i.e., charging higher prices for inactive consumer
and lower prices for active consumers) [13]. This concern, together with rising electricity prices,
prompted the introduction of a range of policy instruments in various countries for promoting
consumer switching. These instruments can be categorised into two broad groups, namely, indirect,
and direct. The indirect approach focuses on redressing market-related factors (such as tariff complexity,
and high information cost) that affect the behaviour of consumer switching through, for example, tariff
simplification, provision of standardised information on energy offers and bills, and introduction of a
tariff comparison website [14].
In contrast, the main focus of the direct approach is to influence the switching behaviour of energy
consumers by communication-based interventions. In recent years, the direct approach has attracted
increasing policy attention around the world, especially in countries (such as, Australia and New
Zealand), where deeper retail market reform is currently under consideration [15,16]. This attention
has primarily arisen from growing recognition of the difficulty of promoting consumer switching
indirectly by redressing market-related barriers, due to the presence of psychological biases that could
deviate the behaviour of energy consumers away from economic rationality. Therefore, the direct
approach is widely considered as a promising solution, mainly because of its ability to encourage
consumer switching by considering psychological bias.
One interesting application of the direct approach is the communication-based trials implemented by
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) over the period 2016–2019. Ofgem is the independent
regulator of the gas and electricity industries in the UK. It was created in 1999 by combining the
functions and operations of the former gas and electricity regulators, the Office of Gas Supply and
the Office of Electricity Regulation. Its main responsibilities are to protect energy consumers’ interests,
promote competition and innovation, and ensure the secure supply of low-cost energy services [17].
The communication-based trials were implemented by Ofgem as a response to a report on retail energy
markets released by the Competition and Market Authority (CMA) in 2016, which argued that weak
consumer switching and the existence of a large group of inactive consumers gave incumbent energy
suppliers a position of unilateral market power. These suppliers could exploit their market power
through price discrimination—setting their standard variable tariffs (tariffs for inactive consumers
who have not chosen their own energy suppliers) higher than non-standard tariffs. To rectify the
situation, it recommended several measures to be undertaken by Ofgem for promoting consumer
switching [18]. Key measures included: (1) research and trials to find new and more effective ways
of encouraging consumer switching; and (2) establishing a database of non-switching consumers
to support the research and trials. These measures are also known as the database remedy [18].
The implementation of these measures led to the development of an Ofgem-administered database of
about 8 million non-switching consumers in the UK who have been on the standard variable tariffs
for three years or more, and the trials of various communication-based interventions to encourage
consumer switching [19].
The main purpose of this paper is to review the experience of the Ofgem trials in the UK,
with a view to draw some lessons that policy makers and planners may like to consider while
designing their own programs for reforming retail energy markets. Some studies have already been
undertaken to assess the experience of the Ofgem trials, focusing on the impacts of a particular
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intervention (for example, a follow-up reminder) on shaping consumer switching [20–23]. In this paper,
the experience of the Ofgem trials is examined from a more pragmatic, policy-oriented perspective,
which focuses on the overall effectiveness of the communication-based approach for encouraging
consumer switching. This examination, we contend, could enable the development of valuable insights
into how psychological bias can deviate energy consumer behaviour away from economic rationality.
This is especially true if one notes that in the case of the UK’s energy market, there still exists a large
proportion of inactive energy consumers, despite significant efforts made since the early 2000s to
redress market-specific barriers for promoting consumer engagement. Some key elements of these
efforts include: the removal of the retail price cap and the introduction of the Confidence Code for
governing the commercial price comparison websites in 2002, the imposition of several obligations
(such as, provision of price comparison and cost information on energy bills) on energy suppliers in
2010, aimed at removing ‘unjustified price differentials’, and the simplification of energy tariffs in
2011 [24,25]. These efforts have led to the removal of major market-specific barriers for consumer
engagement in the UK’s energy markets and improvements in the ease of switching, as indicated by
high switching rates in the UK when compared with other countries [11,14]. However, the prevalence
of inactive consumers indicates that switching behaviour is not only influenced by economic rationality
but importantly, by psychological bias. The communication-based trials implemented by Ofgem were
mainly aimed at redressing these non-market barriers, to promote more active consumer engagement in
the UK’s energy market. A review of the UK’s experience would therefore provide valuable insights for
other countries where reforms are currently under consideration for redressing the issue of consumer
disengagement in the energy market [16,26].
This paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the framework employed in this
paper to assess the Ofgem trials. Section 3 analyses the Ofgem trials based on the application of this
framework. Section 4 provides some further discussion on the analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper
and discusses policy implications.
2. Method
This section reviews existing literature on the barriers for consumer switching in the energy
market, and informed by insights gained from the review, presents the analytical framework adopted
in this paper.
2.1. Existing Literature on Consumer Engagement
There is a vast amount of studies that has been undertaken over the years on identifying the
barriers for consumer engagement in the energy market. These studies can be broadly categorised into
two groups.
The first group is built on rational choice theory that views household consumers as economic
beings (homo economicus), who make rational decisions in order to maximise their utility under
budgetary constraints [27]. Their rationality may however be bounded by limited access to (complete)
information required to make optimal decisions, and restricted cognitive capacity to process the
information and translate that information into action [28–30]. This means that the decision not to
switch electricity retailers made by household consumers may be rational, if they believe that the costs
incurred by switching to an alternative retailer or a better contract provided by the incumbent retailer
would exceed the expected benefits that may arise from switching [31].
The second group is built on behavioural economics that originates from the economic thoughts
of Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Thaler, and many others [32]. This school of thought
strongly criticises the ‘rational economic agent’ assumption of mainstream economics, which views the
decisions made by an energy consumer as being exclusively driven by the considerations of utility
maximisation. Instead, it suggests that these decisions are also affected by psychological biases, which
could lead to significant deviations from rational decision-making [33–35]. Most of the psychological
biases are related to information-processing rules (i.e., mental shortcuts), also known as heuristics.
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They arise when energy consumers are making decisions under specific situations (e.g., risk, uncertainty,
and complexity) [36,37]. The outcome of these psychological biases is the so-called status quo bias,
where household energy consumers tend to stay with their incumbent retailer (the default option),
even though better options are available in the market and switching costs are low [27,38,39].
Existing studies have, therefore, identified two broad categories of barriers for consumer
engagement in the energy market. Studies built on rational choice theory tend to view the high
costs of switching to alternative energy suppliers as the main barriers for consumer engagement.
They accordingly suggest that the market outcomes (expressed in terms of consumer switching) can
be improved by reducing the switching costs, and this can be achieved by, for example, providing
energy consumers with more information (e.g., by creating online price comparison tools), reducing
the complexity of pricing and discount information in energy offers, and simplifying the switching
process [40–43]. As guided by insights gained from these studies, regulators in various countries have
required energy suppliers to provide their consumers with more and clearer information and have
mandated the creation of online price comparison tools, in order to promote more active consumer
engagement in the energy market [14,44,45]. Despite some positive outcomes, many consumers
remain inactive, even though significant savings are available to them if they switch to alternative
suppliers [18].
Studies informed by behavioural economics highlight the importance of psychological bias, to explain
why reducing switching costs alone is insufficient for encouraging more active consumer engagement.
Accordingly, in addition to measures for reducing switching costs, these studies also suggest to directly
influence the switching behaviour of energy consumers through communication-based interventions
that consider their psychological biases as the means of encouraging more active consumer engagement
in the energy market [22]. This suggestion is supported by emerging evidence from other sectors
where communication-based interventions have increased consumer engagement. For example, in the
health sector of the United States, Ref [46] found that sending people a letter with personalised cost
information on health insurance plans (also freely available online) increased the rates of insurance
plan switching to 28%, from 17% in the control group with no letter intervention. It is also found that
plan switching saves on average about $100 per year for those people who have switched to alternative
insurance plans. Similarly, in the banking sector of the UK, Ref [47] found that sending a letter to bank
account holders with a pre-filled return switching form as well as a reminder increased the switching
rate by up to 9%, when compared with the control group with no letter intervention. Several studies
have also been undertaken to examine the effectiveness of various types of communication-based
interventions in facilitating behavioural change. These include, for example, poster messages for
promoting stair-climbing behaviour in the workplace [48], clearer labelling for encouraging the
purchase of energy-efficient appliances [49], and text messages, emails, or letters for encouraging
energy savings in the household sector [50]. There are also some studies that analyse whether some
types of communication-based interventions are more effective than others in facilitating behavioural
change [51].
2.2. Framework for Analysing the Ofgem Trials
In the analytical framework adopted in this paper, the Ofgem trials are first reviewed, with the
aim of assessing the extent to which these trials could overcome the two broad categories of barriers
(namely, switching costs, and psychological biases) for energy consumer switching discussed in the
preceding section. This is then juxtaposed against the actual outcome (expressed in terms of consumer
switching) of the Ofgem trials in order to develop insights into their overall effectiveness. Further,
this framework considers the most widely discussed barriers for energy consumer switching in the
literature. An overview of these barriers is presented in Table 1, and further details are provided below.
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Table 1. Barriers for consumer switching.
Barriers Descriptions
Switching costs
Information costs: opportunity costs of the time taken up
in searching for alternative retail offers, and for
information in understanding their benefits and costs.
Transaction costs: costs incurred during contracting
processes and procedures when switching.
Psychological biases
Loss and risk aversions
Tendency to put high weight on losses and risks than
comparably sized gains and certainty, resulting in the
so-called status quo bias.
Complexity aversion Tendency to retain the status quo in the situation ofdecision complexity with too much choice.
Trust as a
decision heuristic
The status quo bias may get further strengthened if
energy consumers consider alternative energy suppliers
as untrustworthy.
Hyperbolic discounting
Tendency to put high weight on benefits and costs in the
short-term than in the long-term.
This may encourage the energy consumers to stay with
their existing suppliers because the switching costs are
immediate, whereas the benefits from switching
gradually accrue over time.
Normative social
influence
Consumers are more likely to switch after being
suggested by their neighbours, friends, and relatives
(neighbourhood norm).
Availability bias Tendency to make decisions based on the most easilyaccessible information in memory.
Source: Developed by the authors based on the discussion in Section 2.2.
Switching costs may be real or perceived, and they are incurred when switching happens [52].
These costs can be grouped into two broad categories, namely, information costs and transaction costs.
Information costs refer to the opportunity costs of the time taken in searching for alternative retail offers,
and for information in understanding the benefits and costs of these offers [53]. How high these costs
are is dependent on several factors, such as, a priori knowledge, education, and public information
availability [34,54,55]. Transaction costs occur during contracting processes and procedures when
switching. Some examples of these costs are handling charges, and early termination fees [52,56].
Some of the key psychological biases are loss and risk aversions. Household consumers are often
found to put significantly high weight on losses and risks than comparably sized gains and certainty.
This will in turn lead to loss and risk averse behaviours [57,58]. An outcome of these behaviours is
the status quo bias—a tendency for energy consumers to stay with their default option, despite the
existence of better options in the market [40]. This tendency may get further strengthened if energy
consumers perceive switching as complex due to too much choice [59] and consider alternative energy
suppliers as untrustworthy [60].
Another important psychosocial factor that could strengthen the status quo bias is hyperbolic
discounting, where household consumers attach high weight to benefits and costs in the short-term than
the long-term [61]. Because the switching costs are immediate, whereas the benefits from switching
to a cheaper energy deal gradually accrue over time, energy consumers are more likely to stay with
their current energy supplier, even though the short-term switching costs may be smaller than the
long-term benefits from switching [62,63].
Besides, consumer engagement could also be affected by normative social influence, as energy
consumers are likely to follow the behaviour of their neighbours [40]. It is found that household
consumers tend to conform to a neighbourhood norm, when they start looking for alternative energy
supply options after being suggested by their neighbours [57]. However, the reverse of this tendency
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may sometimes happen if some consumers believe that non-normative behaviour is more favourable
and behave in that way will help improve their social status and self-image [64,65].
In addition, some people tend to make decisions based on the information most readily available
in memory, which may sometimes produce biased assessments of the likelihood of different outcomes
that are relevant to their decision-making. This tendency is known as the availability bias [66]. It means
that energy consumers who have switched their energy suppliers before are more likely to switch
again, especially if their switching experience has been positive.
3. Assessment of the Ofgem Trials
Ofgem implemented two main groups of database trials on energy consumer switching during the
period 2016 to 2019. They are: the Better Offer trials, and the Collective Switching trials. These trials
are reviewed in this section, with the aim of assessing their effectiveness. This assessment is made
based on the application of the analytical framework discussed in the previous section.
3.1. Better Offer Trials
The Better Offer trials comprised three trials, namely, the Small-Scale trial, the Cheaper Market
Offer Letters (CMOL) trial, and the Cheaper Market Offer Communications (CMOC) trial. These trials
involved sending select energy consumers a simple and personalised letter highlighting the potential
savings from switching and signposting up to six cheaper energy deals. These were expected to
reduce the inconvenience consumers would experience in searching the market for cheaper energy
deals [67]. This inconvenience may arise from (1) high opportunity costs incurred by time-consuming
tasks of searching for alternative energy deals and information required for appreciating their benefits
and costs; (2) decision complexity with too much information; and (3) concerns about loss and risk
associated with switching.
Key features of the three Better Offer trials are summarised in Table 2. Further details are
provided below.
The Small-Scale trial involved 2400 energy consumers (1200 from each of the two select large
retailers) who had been on default tariffs for at least three years. Each consumer was randomly assigned
to receive either (1) up to six marketing letters from other retailers (the CMA group); or (2) a best offer
letter from Ofgem (the BOL group); or (3) no letter (the control group). Before that, customers in the
CMA and BOL groups also received a letter informing them that they can choose to opt-out if they
decide not to participate in the trial [68].
Compared with the Small-Scale trial, the Cheaper Market Offer Letters (CMOL) trial involved
a larger group of default tariff customers (around 150,000 from two select retailers) who had been
on default tariffs for at least one year. Besides, the CMOL trial also gave specific emphasis on
reducing the decision complexity by limiting the number of energy deals included in the letter to three,
and encouraging the energy consumers to act by using a more trustful messenger (Ofgem or current
suppliers) [20].
The Cheaper Market Offers Communications (CMOC) trial was the largest and the most complex
trial among the three Better Offer trials. It involved around 600,000 energy consumers from five
select suppliers (three large and two mediums) who had been on default tariffs for at least 3 months.
Consumers of the three large suppliers were randomly allocated to 9 groups, using a 2 × 4 factorial
design with a do-nothing control group. These consumers received communication from their own
suppliers: with or without a follow up reminder; by letter or according to their preferred means (either
letter or email); and with three cheaper energy deals from alternative suppliers or two from alternative
suppliers and one from their own suppliers [69]. Similarly, consumers of the two medium suppliers
were randomly allocated to 5 groups, using a 2 × 2 factorial design with a do-nothing control group.
These consumers received communication from their own suppliers: by letter or according to their
preferred means (either letter or email); and with three cheapest energy deals from alternative suppliers
or tariffs in the market or two from alternative suppliers and one from their own suppliers [69].
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Table 2. The Better Offer trials: Key features.




Information costs provision of simple and summarised information regarding the potential savingsfrom switching and better energy deals
Transaction costs provision of needed information (e.g., current supplier, tariff name, and annual energy consumption)and steps for switching
Psychological biases
Loss and risk aversions highlight potential savings from switchingassurances that switching is ‘easy and safe’ and will ‘not lead to supply cut-off’
Complexity aversion simple and summarisedinformation
simple and summarised information
limit the number of energy deals
included in the letter to three
simple and summarised information
limit the number of energy deals
included in the letter to three
a reminder to help overcome
procrastination in making
complex decisions
Trust as a decision heuristic n.a. letter sent by a trusted messenger(Ofgem or existing supplier)
letter sent by a trusted messenger
(existing supplier)
Hyperbolic discounting reduced upfront costs (information and transaction costs) for switchinghighlighted long-term savings from switching
Normative social influence n.a. n.a. n.a.
Availability bias n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: ‘n.a.’ indicates that no explicit consideration has been given to overcome the barriers for consumer engagement. Source: Developed by the authors based on the discussion in
Section 3.1.
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3.2. Collective Switching Trials
In the Collective Switching trials, a series of three letters were sent to select energy consumers
over a seven-week period, to offer them a cheaper and exclusive energy deal and signpost them to a
switching service provider (energy helpline) who already had their information and data [70]. The first
letter informed the consumers that (1) they were on one of the most expensive energy tariffs; (2) they
were eligible for a cheaper and exclusive tariff (negotiated by Ofgem and not available on the market);
and (3) they could opt out of the trials. The second letter informed the consumers of their personalised
savings from switching to the exclusive tariff, and the steps to take to switch (energy helpline website
and phone number were provided). The third letter was a reminder for the consumers [70].
Key features of the Collective Switching trials are summarised in Table 3. Further details are
provided as follows. In the trials, energy consumers were provided with an exclusive energy deal;
this deal was negotiated by Ofgem and not available on the market. This was expected to create
a scarcity effect to provide additional incentives for consumers to switch, because people are more
likely to choose products that are perceived as scarce. The second letter highlighted personalised
savings for consumers from switching to the exclusive offer, estimated based on their current energy
consumption and tariffs. This letter also assured consumers that (1) switching would not affect their
existing billing and payment options and not lead to supply interruption; and (2) the exclusive offer
would be provided by a credible supplier. These were expected to redress loss and risk aversions that
could hamper consumer engagement. In the trials, some attention was also given to normative social
influence by highlighting that the consumers have been on one of the most expensive energy deals,
implying that they have paid more than other people [70].




provision of simple and summarised information
regarding the potential savings from switching
and one exclusive deal
Transaction costs provision of needed information (energyhelpline websiteand contact number) and steps for switching
Psychological biases
Loss and risk aversions
highlight personalised savings if switching to the
exclusive offer in the second letter
assurances: switching would not affect existing billing
and payment options, and the exclusive deal would be
provided by a credible supplier
Complexity aversion
provision of simple and summarised information
in three letters
only one exclusive deal
the third letter: a reminder to help overcome
procrastination in making complex decisions
Trust as a
decision heuristic
all three letters from either Ofgem or
consumers’ current suppliers
Hyperbolic discounting
reduced upfront costs (information and transaction costs)
for switching
highlight long-term savings from switching
Normative social
influence
highlight that the consumers have been on one of the
most expensive energy deals, implying that they have
paid more than others
Availability bias second collective switching intervention 6 months afterthe initial intervention
Source: Developed by the authors based on the discussion in Section 3.2.
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3.3. Analysis of the Results
As discussed above, Ofgem undertook several trials on energy consumer engagement over the
period 2016 to 2019. These trials essentially sought to stimulate consumer switching by overcoming
the economic (i.e., information and transaction costs) and psychological (for example, status quo
bias) barriers. In doing so, each of these trials was designed to test the effectiveness of specific
interventions on encouraging consumer switching. The tests were undertaken through randomised
controlled experiments, where the participants were randomly assigned to two or more groups, with
one (the control group) receiving no intervention, and the others (the experiment groups) receiving the
interventions being tested. Table 4 presents a summarised overview of the outcomes (i.e., switching
rates) of the Ofgem trials. The main points, based on a review of the table and discussion in the
previous sections, are presented below.
Table 4. Switching rates of the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) trials: A summary.
Trial Group
Switching Rate (%)
Internal External Total No Switching
Small-Scale
CMA 8.4 5.0 13.4 86.6
BOL 7.1 5.0 12.1 87.9
Control 2.0 4.8 6.8 93.2
CMOL
Ofgem 0.6 1.8 2.4 97.6
Supplier 0.9 2.5 3.4 96.6
Control 0.3 0.7 1.0 99.0
CMOC
Experiment 2.9 3.9 6.8 93.2
Control 1.4 1.5 2.9 97.1
Collective
Switching
Experiment n.a. n.a. 14.0–29.5 86.0–70.1
Control n.a. n.a. 2.0–4.5 98.0–95.5
Notes: n.a. = not available; experiment = experiment groups that receive the interventions; control = control group
receiving no intervention; internal = consumers switched to alternative energy deals provided by their existing
suppliers; external = consumers switched to energy deals provided by alternative suppliers. Sources: [20,67–69].
The communication-based interventions had positive impacts on consumer switching, as indicated
by higher switching rates (2.4–29.5%) in the experiment groups than that in the control groups (1.0–6.8%).
These impacts also appeared to vary significantly across the trials, suggesting that some interventions
were more effective than others. For example:
In the Small-Scale trial, the switching rate is 13.4% for the CMA group that received letter
interventions from alternative suppliers (see Table 3). This is slightly higher than that for the BOL group
that received letter interventions from Ofgem, implying that consumers are more comfortable receiving
information on alternative energy deals from suppliers. This viewpoint gets further substantiated
by the CMOL trial, where switching rates are increased from 1% in the control group to 2.4–3.4% in
the experiment groups, and this impact is more significant for those consumers who received the
supplier-branded letters (3.4% in the supplier group), as presented in Table 3. Similar results are also
found in the Collective Switching trials, where switching rates are higher (26.9%) in the group that
received supplier-branded letters than that in other experiment groups (15.0–18.5%) [70].
In the CMOC trial, sending a reminder is found to have significantly increased the switching rates
by 27%, from 5.9% for those with no reminder, to 7.5% for those with reminder [69]. This implies that
the reminder communication could be a powerful tool for redressing consumer inertia when making
complex decisions. Higher switching rates (14.0–29.5%, as presented in Table 3) of the Collective
Switching trials may lend further credence to this viewpoint, because one of the key factors that
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differentiates these trials from the Better Offer trials is the sending of a series of three letter interventions
with the third letter as a reminder.
As shown in Table 3, the switching rates are much higher (14.0–29.5%) in the Collective Switching
trials than that in the three Better Offer trials (2.4–13.4%). This could partly be explained by the
so-called choice overload, where consumers have a difficult time making a decision when faced with
many options, as more choices are available to the customers in the Best Offer trials (no less than three)
than the Collective Switch trails (only one).
It worth noting that it would be useful to discuss the variation of the effectiveness of
communication-based interventions in encouraging consumer switching across age and income
groups. This discussion, however, cannot be developed because the Ofgem trials were implemented
with information provided by energy suppliers, who do not require their customers to provide
demographic information [22]. There is therefore a lack of information required for analysing the effect
of demographic factors in shaping the switching behaviour of the energy consumers.
4. Some Further Discussion
As discussed in the previous section, the Ofgem trials made positive impacts on consumer
engagement, as indicated by high switching rates (2.4–29.5%) in the experiment groups receiving
letter interventions, compared with switching rates of 1.0–6.8% in the control groups receiving no
intervention. There also appeared to be a significant variation in these impacts across the trials,
suggesting that some interventions (most notably, supplier as a messenger, reminder communication,
and less choices) were more effective than others. However, the overall impacts of the Ofgem trials were
moderate, and around 70% of participants did not switch even in the most impactful trial. There are
three possible explanations.
Firstly, the behaviour of energy consumers to stay with their default supply option could be
influenced by a myriad of factors, and these factors are not fully understood, which makes the design
of effective intervention difficult. As argued in Lunn (2014, p 45), ‘Designing a good policy is made
more awkward by the fact that the reasons why defaults are so powerful are not fully understood’ [71].
If it is not clear which factor drives the behaviour in each specific case, the intervention designed to
drive behavioural change may be less effective [72]. Similar argument is echoed by Lunn (2012, p 440):
‘Many important issues in BE (Behavioural Economics) are complex and unresolved. Behavioural
economists themselves have not reached a shared understanding of which behavioural findings have
the strongest impacts on behaviour, nor in what contexts behavioural biases result in benefit or harm.
Yet these issues can be pivotal for the policymaker’ [73].
Secondly, the impacts of various behaviour-influencing factors may be different across the
consumers. For example, it is found in [58] that consumers are unlikely to change energy suppliers
if they perceive high switching costs, and these effects are much higher for those who have limited
switching experience in other markets. Similarly, [59] found that consumers’ attitudes to markets
(e.g., big bargain hunter, life is too short, and feelings of regret) are correlated with their switching
behaviour, with considerable variation in the strength and statistical significance of these relationships,
implying different impacts of attitudes on switching behaviour amongst consumers. This variation
means that a one-size-fits-all intervention may not be the most effective way to encourage consumer
switching. Rather, a wide variety of interventions is needed to stimulate switching activity effectively
amongst different consumers [74]. This viewpoint is underlined by the outcomes of the Ofgem trials
which show that different consumers reacted quite differently to the same intervention: some switched
internally to a cheaper deal provided by their current suppliers, and some others switched externally to
alternative suppliers, and the remaining consumers decided to stay with their current supply options
(see Table 3).
Thirdly, the socio-material structures that may hinder behavioural changes required for consumers
to actively engage with the energy market are not explicitly considered. This viewpoint stems from the
social practice theory that views individuals as not consuming energy for its own sake, but relying on it
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to facilitate social practices (for example, cooking, watching TV or conducting meetings) [75]. This view
moves the focus of energy analysis, away from individual behaviour, towards energy-consuming
practices. According to [62], social practice is ‘a routinised type of behaviour which consists of several
elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’
and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion
and motivational knowledge’ [76]. These elements can be further grouped into three categories of
interconnected elements of practice: material, competence and meaning [77]. Material comprises
all physical activities (for example, the use of material artefacts) required for performing a practice.
Competence is referred to as the skills and knowledge required to perform a practice through,
for example, the use of material artefacts. Meaning refers to the beliefs, emotions, and ideas associated
with a practice, which have deep cultural and historical roots [78,79]. In the context of energy, the social
practice theory characterises the behaviour of energy consumers as a social phenomenon, meant to
facilitate social practices. Therefore, even if individuals may be incentivised to switch suppliers, there
also exist various socio-material structures that could inhibit this behavioural change [80].
The overlook of the socio-material structures in the Ofgem trials may reflect a general lack of
understanding of how to use and apply insights from the social practice theory in policy making,
although several scholars have over the years called for more practicable applications of social practice
theory to develop deeper insights for policymakers [81,82]. As argued by some researchers who are
working or have recently worked in the British government, ‘We’d need to have something that’s
accessible, that’s got some evidence underneath it, some case studies. If we could have some evidence
on its application as well as theory. We would be the ones who would be promoting it. Social practice
theory needs to be crystallised in concepts which people can understand. You need micro-applications
of it. Little trials of social practice theory’ [80].
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has analysed the design features and outcomes of the database trials on energy
consumer engagement implemented by Ofgem over the period 2016–2019. The results of the analysis
suggest that the Ofgem trials have made positive impacts on consumer engagement, as evidenced by
higher switching rates (2.4–29.5%) in the experiment groups than that (1.0–6.8%) in the control groups.
There also appeared to be a significant variation in these impacts across the trials, suggesting that
some interventions (most notably, supplier as a messenger, reminder communication and less choices)
were more effective than others. Nevertheless, the overall impacts of the Ofgem trials appeared to be
moderate, as around 70% of participants remained inactive even in the most impactful trial, reflecting
a general lack of understanding in the literature of the behaviour-influencing factors, their impacts,
and their context-connects.
The paragraphs below discuss the issues arising from the results of the analysis undertaken in this
paper that policymakers and energy planners may like to consider while designing reform programs
for their energy markets.
The difficulty in stimulating consumer switching, as demonstrated by the Ofgem trials, poses a
problem for the energy regulator and policymakers. Is price discrimination an inevitable outcome
of market competition? Or is it an outcome of the use of market power to exploit more ‘naïve’ and
inactive household consumers? The Ofgem trials are premised on the argument that weak consumer
switching is an indication of market inefficiency, because it gives large energy suppliers ‘a position of
unilateral market power concerning their inactive customer base’ which they can exploit through the
practice of price discrimination [18]. An alternative argument, put forward or supported by several
renowned energy economists and former energy regulators, is that the practice of price discrimination
does not necessarily reflect the exercise of market power and unfair pricing, as suggested by CMA.
Rather, it may also indicate significant competition and welfare-enhancing pricing, especially when
prices and retail margins in aggregate are not significantly higher than what is normally regarded as a
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competitive market level. In these cases, any intervention aimed at encouraging customer engagement
is more likely to undermine competition, resulting in welfare losses [24,83].
Existing energy literature suggests that for a homogeneous product like electricity, suppliers
tend to rely on price differences to attract consumers, and this tendency provides incentives to
both incumbents and new entrants to offer cheaper energy deals [84]. But not all consumers take
advantage of these deals. In an empirical analysis of the New Zealand electricity market, [72] found
that about 14% of energy consumers are captive and unlikely to switch suppliers for any bill savings.
Based on an analysis of the behaviour of suppliers and household consumers in the Norwegian energy
market, [73] found that there exists a very competitive market segment with active consumers and
lower energy prices and a monopolistic market segment with inactive consumers and higher energy
prices. Likewise, [26] found that in the Dutch electricity market, a large proportion of consumers did
not switch suppliers after the introduction of retail competition and remained on default offers, which
are more expensive than other offers available in the market. The outcomes of the Ofgem trial may lend
further credence to these findings, as a large fraction of consumers (70.1–96.6%) did not switch even
with the introduction of various interventions aimed at stimulating engagement activity (see Table 3).
The market segmentation between active and inactive consumers allows energy suppliers to
implement strategies of price discrimination, simply to survive in the market. Therefore, consumer
segmentation and the practice of price discrimination may simply reflect significant competition, rather
than a lack of it, especially if retail margins in general are not significantly above the competitive
level [85,86]. As explained in [69]: ‘In order to survive and operate economically, most energy suppliers
seem to need a combination of less engaged customers on higher tariffs and more engaged customers
on lower tariffs. If all their customers are on a single high-priced tariff, they lose customers. If all their
customers are on a single low-price tariff, they cannot cover their total costs. In either case, they would
eventually go out of business’.
However, price discrimination may raise the question about ‘fairness’, especially involving
vulnerable consumers. Here, particular attention is given to equal outcomes rather than equal
opportunities, which further give rise to a fundamental question about the appropriateness of
market-based arrangements for pricing electricity. A full-length discourse—aimed at redressing this
question—will require considerable additional research, involving tracing back to the philosophical
debate between the Roman and Greek doctrines of Verum Pertium (natural price) and Justum Pretium
(just price). This is beyond the scope of this paper. Despite this, it is plausible to argue that while
the communication-based interventions may seem intuitively attractive, they are likely to undermine
fairness by further raising the prices for inactive consumers. This is so because these interventions could
encourage more active consumer engagement and hence place additional pressure on energy suppliers
to offer cheaper prices to attract active consumers. In order to operate economically, the suppliers
would then need to increase energy prices offered to the inactive segment of the consumers, leading to
further exploitation of the inactive consumers.
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